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Introduction
“How far that little candle throws his beams! So shines a 
good deed in a weary world.” This is a quote from the 
Merchant of Venice (Shakespeare, 1596-1599). Within our 
context, the candle (or good deed) is effective corporate gov-
ernance, for instance, the recommendations and guidelines 
provided by academics and policy-makers (such as the 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 
or OECD). Both academics and policy-makers “do good 
deeds” by providing recommendations and guidance on cor-
porate governance for businesses (Bottenberg, Tuschke, & 
Flickinger, 2016). However, academics and policy-makers 
can at times appear to be from two different worlds that do 
not speak the same language. On one hand, many policy-
makers do not seem to be fully aware of relevant academic 
research. On the other hand, academics could gain a better 
understanding of the policy-makers’ agenda by assisting 
them with research (Zattoni, Douglas, & Judge, 2013).
Generally, academic research on corporate governance 
principles adopts a company perspective, by, for example, 
analyzing the firm’s structure (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & 
Grossman, 2002), its performance (Zalewska, 2016), direc-
tors’ remuneration (Urzua Infante, 2009), and compliance 
with corporate governance codes (Aguilera & Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2009). Despite corporate governance principles and 
guidelines being promoted by policy-makers, few studies 
(Cuomo, Mallin, & Zattoni, 2016) adopt a policy-maker per-
spective with a view to reconciling the academic and business 
worlds with the policy-makers’ world. In fact, the state of 
knowledge on corporate governance principles research 
seems to be suffering from a “deadlock” situation, as there is 
conflicting evidence on the effectiveness of national and 
supranational corporate governance codes/principles 
(Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Aguilera, Florackis & 
Kim, 2016). Therefore, it becomes fundamental to understand 
the voice and viewpoint of the policy-maker, namely, the 
OECD, to understand the reasons for the disconnect between 
research and practice, and the continuous waves of corporate 
scandals despite new and improved governance principles.
Furthermore, academic research (Cuomo et al., 2016; 
Haxhi & Aguilera, 2014) finds that companies tend to adopt 
a boilerplate approach to corporate governance, rather than 
following the spirit and the substance of the codes. Therefore, 
it is important to understand why companies do not apply the 
spirit of the codes and how to prevent corporations from pur-
suing a box ticking exercise (i.e., a boilerplate approach).
We interviewed Mats Isaksson who is the head of the 
Corporate Affairs Division at the OECD. He is responsible 
for all issues relating to corporate governance, state-owned 
enterprises, equity markets, company law, privatization, dis-
pute resolution, and other policy areas of importance to a 
sound and dynamic business environment. He has an aca-
demic affiliation with Columbia University and is also a 
senior visiting fellow at the Stockholm Centre for Commercial 
Law. He is a founding director of the Swedish Corporate 
Governance Forum and a member of the European Corporate 
Governance Institute.
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The Interview
Policy-Makers and Academia
There’s a quote from Shakespeare from the Merchant of 
Venice that says “How far that little candle throws his 
beams. So, shines a good deed in a weary world.” Why do 
policy-makers in the corporate governance arena, like , 
for example, the OECD, make so little use of academic 
research? It seems that the academic world and the pol-
icy-maker world do not speak the same language even 
though they both deal with corporate governance.
I think your comment is very thoughtful. You are insinuat-
ing that the academic and policy-maker worlds never meet 
each other. However, I think there are three dimensions we 
need to consider: The first one is policy-makers and busi-
nesses, the second one is policy-makers and academia, and 
the third is between policy-makers and politicians.
As regards the first dimension, which is policy-makers 
and business, corporate governance assumes different mean-
ings for policy-makers and businesses, which are, for me, 
totally legitimate. When business people deal with corporate 
governance, they typically refer to mechanisms and proce-
dures that take place within their organizations, for example, 
improving dynamics in the boardroom, boosting bottom 
lines, controlling executives, and communicating with share-
holders and sometimes with stakeholders. These are issues 
that involve economic interests, and a constant interplay 
between the board and management, and between the board 
and shareholders. That’s their universe, that’s their world, 
and it’s a perfectly legitimate definition of corporate gover-
nance, from their view. However, this perspective does not 
represent the issues policy-makers deal with. We as policy-
makers cannot know what a perfect board of directors looks 
like. We cannot know what the best and perfect strategies are 
for an organization’s future. We as policy-makers are con-
cerned to provide a general regulatory framework in order to 
stimulate investments, to support sustainable economic 
growth, to ensure financial stability, and to promote benefits 
for all stakeholders or society. So, these are our policy 
objectives.
The second dimension is policy-makers and academia. I 
am completely fascinated and interested in the academic per-
spective. I wouldn’t underestimate the influence of academia 
on the corporate governance public policy debate. It seems 
that the corporate governance debate started with three aca-
demics, Berle and Means in 1932 and Manne in 1965, who 
issued their famous manuscripts about the market for corpo-
rate control, which had a tremendous influence on trust leg-
islation in the United States. Another pioneering study is 
Michael Jensen’s The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, 
and the Failure of Internal Control Systems in 1993, which 
had a huge impact on issues like takeovers and equal treat-
ment of shareholders and the role of the board in M&As 
(mergers and acquisitions). Additionally, there is a paper 
published in 2013 by Ronald Gilson and Jeffrey Gordon on 
the agency issue and the U.S. legislation, which is totally 
applicable to the current corporate governance issues. 
Indeed, I’m totally sure that research has and will have an 
influence on jurisprudence in the US in the future. There are 
many other examples of the influence of academia on policy-
makers’ recommendations. Generally, policy-makers get 
inspiration from research and universities and we really take 
into consideration the latest studies.
The third dimension concerns policy-makers and politi-
cians. Policy-makers are different from politicians. Policy-
makers need a broad range of stakeholders like businesses, 
academia, international institutions, and advisors to deliver 
general corporate governance principles that look at the 
future, whereas politicians dealing with corporate gover-
nance may be more focused on rules that have short-run 
effects on corporate governance for two main reasons. First, 
they are more concerned to provide immediate impacts of 
their corporate rules in order to positively influence the elec-
torate or citizens. Second, politicians tend to react quickly to 
corporate governance scandals by providing new and stricter 
rules. For instance, after the Enron collapse, the US deliv-
ered the Sarbanes–Oxley Act; after the British home stores 
(BHS) scandal in the UK, the Prime Minister announced that 
new corporate governance rules are due. Politicians, how-
ever, need advisors like us in order to land on straight deci-
sions. There may be some initial, unfounded reactions from 
them, but when we draw closer to rule making, they usually 
listen to us and take into account our policy advice that natu-
rally brings with it academic experience. So, it seems that 
academia is able to partially influence policy-makers that in 
turn are able to affect politicians’ decisions.
Is it true that there is divergence between the policy-mak-
ers and the academic world, for example, in terms of 
codes of principles or recommendations?
Yes, it might be. Corporate governance convergence 
refers to a gradual alignment towards common policies, 
practices, and recommendations among policy-makers, aca-
demics, etc., whereas divergence is the opposite movement 
towards differing and conflicting views of corporate gover-
nance. It appears clear to me that there is divergence even 
among academics and divergence also occurs among policy-
makers as well. But I would say that the OECD is a special 
institution that heeds academic studies, recommendations, 
and findings stemming from other policy-makers. The 
OECD in corporate governance endeavors to coordinate and 
harmonize different practices across the world or in the 
OECD country members. It leads to a complex task in con-
verging country practices and academic studies together, 
given their innate misalignment.
Berle and Means’s study on agency theory has had a huge 
impact on codes in many countries. To what extent has the 
most recent research had an impact on codes and princi-
ples of corporate governance? The last section of every 
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scientific paper typically contains recommendations for 
policy-makers and/or businesses. Do you, as a policy-
maker, effectively take into consideration these recom-
mendations and, if so, how are they taken into account?
Yes, we as a policy-maker read the last paragraphs of 
several manuscripts that identify recommendations for us 
and businesses. In order to prepare corporate governance 
principles and to have a broader view of this phenomenon, 
I talk to business, I talk to trade unions, I talk to politi-
cians, I talk to investors, I talk to asset managers, I talk to 
academics, and I think that everything that lands on my 
desk has its own merits, but always we keep the public 
policy perspective in mind, as a priority. Some ideas men-
tioned in academic manuscripts are sometimes illuminat-
ing and useful to shape our recommendations. For 
example, when we drew the last version of the Corporate 
Governance Principles, we mainly looked at Anglo-Saxon 
literature given its generalizability capacity in terms of 
shareholders, boardroom, and executive characteristics. 
Additionally, we also considered other Western countries’ 
literature to integrate the Anglo-Saxon perspective with a 
more comprehensive approach that heeds institutions, 
stakeholders, and the environment. An argument that I 
could read in an academic paper or I get from some reports 
on how to manage corporate governance issues in the 
boardroom can be extremely convincing. Even though this 
idea is tremendously convincing, we as a policy-maker 
need to evaluate whether it is systemically significant for 
society. When we draw corporate governance principles, 
we usually ask ourselves, is this something that we really 
want to make mandatory or advisable for all corporations? 
Does it have that magnitude? Does it have a systemic 
component? [ . . . ]
One recent example is the issue of the stewardship 
code, which is really à la mode. When we reviewed the 
G20 principles, this obviously came on the table but when 
we actually produced a paper where we, by setting up a 
taxonomy of some investors and their propensity to 
engage in buying corporate shares, and we presented it to 
the group and we said this is our conclusion. We don’t 
really believe that a stewardship code will be effective and 
that it has a systematic component or significance. This 
does not mean that it is the end of the discussion but it has 
actually contributed to people thinking, discussing, and 
sharing their opinions.
How can research be a tool for policy-makers?
I think that based on my experience with academia, which 
is very positive and stimulating, policy-makers need to 
respect academia. However, certain academic works are con-
ducted for mere academic purposes. Academic research 
sometimes doesn’t apply to policy-makers or not even to 
businesses. It’s like replicating somebody else’s study in 
order to test the validity of a given model or theory, for 
instance. Or, sometimes, manuscripts are methodological 
studies. This is a sort of internal debate where policy-makers 
and businesses are not involved. I respect this tremendously. 
In terms of contributions to policy-makers, I believe the first 
step for academia is always to be hard wired to reality by 
conducting empirical works. Many academic studies in cor-
porate governance have just assumed that the world described 
by Berle and Means is the actual business reality whereas the 
de facto the world they projected has not materialized. It 
didn’t materialize in Italy, in Germany, and certainly not in 
the emerging markets. In the US, we have almost the owner-
ship reconcentration issue as in the UK. Berle and Means do 
not deal with financial intermediation, which actually is one 
of the basic features of corporate governance. I believe that 
research can do a better job by looking out for the actual real-
ity and analyzing what the corporate world really looks like 
and what the consequences are.
What do you think should be the avenues for future 
research on corporate governance?
First of all, I have faith in academia and I am sure it will 
surprise me and I want academia to surprise me. I don’t want 
to point hem in any specific direction; however, what it is 
useful for us at the moment is to identify changes in organi-
zations, in business models, and in capital markets, and then 
to try to tease out what the implications of these changes are 
for corporate governance. For instance, it would be interest-
ing to examine what the complex and longer financial chain 
is and how efficient this chain is from household savings to 
the corporation.
Now there are institutional investors which are increasingly 
becoming fewer and fewer, bigger and bigger; there are also 
proxy consultants and other financial intermediaries. There are 
billions of different service providers with conflicts of inter-
ests, so it is not only a matter of conflict between shareholders 
and management as Berle and Means state. [ . . . ].
Another strand is related to corporate assets. In the old 
days, assets tended to be confined within corporates’ fences, 
consequently, it was easy to govern and manage them. Today, 
most of the assets are in networks or in people’s brains or in 
their individual cognitive structure; it’s a different game than 
in the past and that’s another issue that I think is utterly 
important.
As regards another area where academia can contribute 
in the future to corporate governance from a policy per-
spective, I believe that it will be increasingly important to 
look at the functioning of modern capital markets, the 
length and the complexity of the investment chain. We 
don’t have shareholders like we used to have. We have the 
business models of stock exchanges, for example, and we 
have the whole issue of the ownership structures in listed 
companies today and if we look around the world like we 
have to do as a global organization, we see that concen-
trated ownership is usually the rule rather than the excep-
tion. This research area I think for the future of corporate 
governance research would be vital.
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Corporate Governance Principles and Corporate 
Scandals
Some corporate scandals have recently been unearthed, 
for instance in Brazil Petrobras, in the UK, BHS and 
Sports Direct, and VW in Germany. So, it seems that 
codes or recommendations are not able to prevent scan-
dals but just provide additional paperwork for compa-
nies. Why do we still experience these waves of scandals 
given these codes that companies need to apply?
It works exactly like this in any area of society. For instance, 
when a legislator implements a law against environmental 
crimes, it does not mean that these types of crimes will not be 
committed any longer. In corporate governance, it works simi-
larly. I believe that since the early 1990s, tremendous improve-
ments have occurred, especially in terms of shareholder 
protection, insider trading, and executives’ benefits. For 
instance, in the seventies and eighties, no legislation was set-
tled on banks’ funding. Furthermore, some big family busi-
nesses diverted their financial resources for the family’s own 
interests, for instance, to buy a personal jet, to pay extremely 
luxurious holidays with the company’s money, etc. At that 
time, it was not even an issue. Now, at least, it is a crime! Thus, 
we cannot underestimate the progress we have made on corpo-
rate governance during the last decades. A lot of corporate 
governance issues have been improved but others may not 
have been resolved like the executives’ remuneration.
Some of the scandals that we experience today could be the 
consequence of better corporate governance regulation, because 
there is more scope for whistle-blowing, more scope for trans-
parency, and more access to information. In other words, some 
scandals may actually be a sign of a better corporate culture, 
meaning that these kinds of governance issues or misbehaviors 
are not acceptable any longer. In the olden days, the same gov-
ernance issues, which now are conceived as being a scandal, 
were perceived as socially acceptable. There were cases of col-
lusion between governments and companies to resolve an orga-
nization’s misconduct under the table. An historian will probably 
tell us more comprehensively about those relationships.
Today, we still experience shortcomings; however, there 
are ongoing criminal investigations on these cases you men-
tioned before, BHS, Sports Direct, VW; so, I would put them 
in a separate category. The more interesting question is prob-
ably why corporations fail to put in place governance struc-
tures that would objectively be good for them. Why do they 
have suboptimal governance structures? I think these are 
intriguing questions.
What do you think the answers could be?
Perhaps, there is not enough awareness of benefits of cor-
porate governance recommendations. They are not laws or 
“totem pole,” so we sometimes experience suboptimal gov-
ernance structures because corporate decision-makers, like 
directors and executives, may rather subvert these noncom-
pulsory principles to pursue other interests.
Indeed, we also need to remember that the directors and 
executives’ job market is extremely competitive and focuses 
on money making. Directors’ priority is to maximize compa-
nies’ income at every quarter and their assessment and remu-
neration are actually based on such a short-term view of their 
results. Many corporate decision-makers are mainly driven 
by money. I personally know some of them and it’s hard to 
have a discussion other than money, which is totally fine.
This means that corporations fail to put in place optimal 
governance systems, because directors and executives are 
substantially focused on the short-term view without captur-
ing in time the environmental signs. Companies’ decision-
makers may also be characterized by hubris, I mean a far too 
high level of confidence that prevents them from actually 
listening to and analyzing contrasting opinions arising from 
inside and outside a company. It seems that those corporate 
decision-makers characterized by short termism and hubris 
are more inclined to fall into the old way of thinking, without 
innovating their corporate strategies and without heeding the 
signs, opinions, and voices raised from outside. Sometimes, 
I feel directors misperceive the reality.
Codes are on a “comply or explain” basis. Scholars cast 
doubt on the effectiveness of this approach, because most of 
companies comply in form rather than in substance. How 
will it be possible to prevent companies from complying just 
in form? How influential are corporate governance codes on 
practice?
To prevent a “ticking-the-box” behavior, there are some 
remedies to put forward.
As regards the first remedy, it may be controversial but 
some vital corporate governance issues need to be regulated 
in legislation or laws that lead to supervision and rules’ 
enforcement to effectively implement principles.
The second remedy is probably to make sure that the 
codes we put in place are truly relevant to companies. Codes 
of corporate governance may have very unclear concepts and 
codes that themselves can be nebulous as well, because they 
exist in many different forms. For example, the one in 
Germany is very different from the one in Japan; and the 
United States doesn’t even have a code but they don’t seem 
to be doing much worse. I believe that these codes need to be 
seen as meaningful and well-reasoned for companies and 
their decision-makers. The challenge here is to make princi-
ples perceived as meaningful, vital, and essential by direc-
tors. Who should do that? I think it is a combination of 
responsibilities: policy-makers, legislators, and stakehold-
ers, like media, should proactively persuade corporate deci-
sion-makers of the principles’ importance.
The third remedy is related to the negotiation process. I 
believe that some of the codes that I’ve seen being developed 
do not have a solid negotiation process with the stakeholders; 
it seems they are based on previous experience where the 
needs of stakeholders are merely assumed. This is not the 
case for the OECD principles which are shaped by the 
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negotiation process between different parties. [ . . . ]. From 
our perspective, there are winners and losers; it is a sort of 
give and take process. In other words, in shaping principles, 
we know that some of the parties in the market will suffer 
from this, but at the end these recommendations reflect the 
relative strengths of different parties at a given time, in a 
given situation, on a specific subject. It could be both a 
strength and a weakness with these codes. It becomes vital to 
map and understand perspectives and opinions of the other 
parties in order to get shared and well-developed corporate 
governance principles.
During this long negotiation or legislation process, what 
are the roles of academia and research?
There are two things you don’t want to know how they are 
made: sausages and legislation. Bismarck, the German 
Chancellor, said this. I have to say that discussion on corpo-
rate governance principles and the negotiation process are 
rather vibrant.
The academia and research role is very prominent. For 
instance, after the burst of the financial crisis in 2008, we had 
constant meetings with a committee composed of academics 
and researchers in order to deeply investigate the causes of 
the crisis and the consequences for corporate governance. 
Even now, we regularly meet this committee, and amongst 
the others, we have different prominent researchers from dif-
ferent universities across the world.
Well, these are academics that I have known for a long time, 
so now I should meet and engage with the next generation. I try 
to keep my eyes open for the new talents and whoever is doing 
interesting work; that’s why I also spend some time with aca-
demics, like at Columbia; I was at Stanford as a fellow.
How is it possible to achieve successful corporate gover-
nance in a company? What are the secrets?
One of the most important issues is to understand what a 
company wants to get out of it, what the end result a com-
pany is aiming at, considering the corporate governance 
principles. So, I think it is essential that corporate decision-
makers need to firstly make an economic, legal, and cultural 
analysis of the internal and external environment. Secondly, 
they need to define smart objectives and outcomes and then 
keep monitoring them throughout their analyses and their 
discussion groups. If a company is not able to set, monitor, 
and communicate its goals, it will never accomplish success-
ful corporate governance. The company’s objectives should 
not be based only on reaching the breakeven point and a cer-
tain level of revenues, but in order to reach successful corpo-
rate governance, the objectives need to deal with the board’s 
behaviour, the relationship with the executives, satisfying 
stakeholders’ and shareholders’ needs, protecting minorities, 
and keeping institutions satisfied, and foreseeing the envi-
ronment’s needs. This means that maximizing profit cannot 
be the only or the primary goal for a company. The money is 
the final result, and then, a company needs to carefully eval-
uate which decisions are needed to make money.
[ . . . It] is fundamental to strike a balance between the 
external financiers’ expectations and the internal needs of a 
company; this implies a rethinking or a new design of corpo-
rate governance structure.
Given the fact that policy-makers or legislators tend to be 
under pressure to react quite quickly to corporate gover-
nance scandals or national, or international events—for 
example, Brexit—what do you think the likely conse-
quences would be, corporate governance wise, of Brexit?
I haven’t started to give that any thought. There is this 
reference to knee jerk reactions, especially in the case of sud-
den political or financial crises. I understand this approach 
but I do not fully sympathize with it. As I was here at the time 
of the Enron scandal, Asian crisis and global financial crisis, 
I know pretty much how it works. When the financial crisis 
happened in 2008, there were many “voices” suggesting we 
should revise the corporate governance principles rather 
quickly. My position was slightly different. I agreed we 
needed to quickly analyze the financial sector, but an imme-
diate revision of the principles would have been dangerous, 
simply because at the time, we could not know the conse-
quences and the implications of the financial crisis on corpo-
rate governance.
I argued my case well because I gained acceptance for 
that. Indeed, instead of automatically modifying the princi-
ples, I suggested to focus on a proper and deep analysis of the 
market and of the corporate environment before issuing any 
other governance recommendations. So, we spent around 4 
years on analytical work, embracing a lot of academic stud-
ies actually to provide a background dossier and an analyti-
cal report on the state of the art.
Do you think there will be any consequences?
If you look at the EU directives linked to corporate gover-
nance, for example, that one on takeovers, they are inspired by 
the U.K. culture, experience, and knowledge. If or, when the 
UK leaves the EU, we will need to start analyzing how Brexit 
will affect these directives and how the dynamics of future 
negotiation will change. These directives of course are imple-
mented in national law, so even though the European setting 
will change because of Brexit, it does not necessarily mean 
that the corporate governance principles will be modified. But 
we don’t know yet; it’s too early. It is like when the financial 
crisis spread in 2008; at that time, we could not immediately 
change the principles and surely, we cannot amend them now. 
However, what we could do is to start a deep analysis of the 
environment to evaluate the effects of Brexit on corporate 
governance. This process has not started yet.
The New OECD Principles
The 2015 G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
are also likely to give further impetus to the debate on 
corporate governance practice around the world. They 
focus mainly on shareholders, the board of directors, and 
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stakeholders. So, it seems that once again agency theory 
is still the dominant approach and able to better provide 
an effective corporate governance framework. So, what 
about institutions and external resources? There is a the-
ory called institutional theory that basically argues that 
companies are influenced and shaped by legal, cultural, 
and governmental institutions. On top of that, there is 
another corporate governance theory, according to which 
companies need also outside resources to function. Where 
do the new OECD principles stand in respect of these two 
approaches?
The G20/OECD principles are unique in the sense that the 
very first chapter deals with the institutional framework. It 
emphasizes the preeminent role of institutions in shaping 
sound and fair corporate governance by taking into consider-
ation the national legal, cultural, economic, and social set-
tings. This is a unique feature. Another section of the 
principles, which is also unique, is related to the functioning 
of capital markets, institutional investors, stock exchanges, 
and other intermediaries. The transparency chapter is also 
fairly big so capital markets already own half of the princi-
ples. The section related to shareholders, stakeholders, and 
the board is common to other corporate governance codes; 
so, special innovation has been brought to this section. Some 
sections are not original, whereas others are rather unique.
As regards the concepts related to the institutional and 
resource dependence theories, despite agency theory and the 
Berle and Means study having deeply influenced corporate 
governance practices, we are experiencing a new wave of 
concepts and governance issues, which are related to the 
importance of institutions and resources. The business world 
is rather different from what it was 20 or 25 years ago. A 
fundamental institution that can shape corporate governance 
is the financial market; for this reason, we needed to care-
fully provide some recommendations on the relationship 
between a corporate and the external market. Indeed, stock 
exchanges have changed corporates’ views. The role of the 
stock exchange, as an external institution, in today’s corpo-
rate environment is fundamental because it is not only able to 
provide external resources but also to influence the corporate 
environment. Furthermore, stock exchanges also shape their 
forms as a result of environmental changes. Investment funds 
and asset managers are deeply influenced by the environ-
ment; indeed, their governance structure has been evolving 
to adapt to the continuous changes. On the other hand, invest-
ment funds and assets managers are able to have an immedi-
ate impact on the corporate environment by, for example, 
providing strict requirements for investments.
What are the disadvantages of supranational corporate 
governance codes or principles?
When it comes to the G20/OECD principles, which is 
probably the only supranational code, I think the risks relate 
to the principles themselves. The very first chapter explicitly 
states that the principles need to be implemented in law and 
regulations in the OECD countries by taking into consider-
ation economics, the cultural and legal context, for instance, 
by considering countries with civil or common law. This 
requires a lot of hard work on behalf of national authorities 
to implement them. The risk might be that countries or 
authorities are lazy and just copy-and-paste our code without 
adapting it to their own economic and social conditions. But 
we don’t believe they are lazy. We believe that they are seri-
ous. This is generally a risk with everything sort of trickling 
down to reduce itself to box ticking, but the G20/OECD prin-
ciples are very clear on the risks of box ticking.
What are the main advantages of supranational corpo-
rate governance codes or principles?
One of the advantages of this whole process with the G20 
and OECD about the new corporate governance principles is 
that there is a genuine exchange of experiences and good 
practices amongst legislators and regulators. Second, we 
have developed a common language and a common under-
standing of some fundamental concepts, for example, related 
party transactions, board composition, and role. This is tre-
mendously important in order to achieve long-term corporate 
governance success, especially in this globalized context. 
For instance, an increasing number of companies deal with 
foreign owners, investors from abroad, or an international 
environment. This is the case of companies with foreign 
blockholders, or companies listed in another foreign country; 
a Chinese corporate listed on the New York Stock Exchange, 
or a foreign external funder, for instance, a Chinese lender 
investing in an American company. So, reaching a common 
understanding, a mutual language, and shared values of cor-
porate governance are beneficial for effective governance. 
On the other hand, some stakeholders are concerned as these 
principles deal with listed companies only, leaving neglected 
the other form of corporates.
Conclusion
In this article, we explore the role of the academia in influ-
encing policy-makers’ decisions, the reasons why corporate 
scandals still happen, some remedies for the “comply and 
explain” approach, and the advantages and disadvantages of 
the OECD principles. Corporate governance codes are 
important pillars in corporate governance, as they provide 
guidance in terms of good corporate practices and promote 
corporate governance principles to standardize companies’ 
processes and mechanisms.
Based on the insightful interview with Mats Isaksson, the 
following key lessons emerge.
1. An organization is more than just a nexus of contracts 
between principals and agents (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). A firm is a combination or a nexus of stake-
holders (Wieland, 2011) and a nexus of relationships 
(Fichman & Levinthal, 1991) that are able to, directly 
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and indirectly influence the firm’s value (Galunic & 
Rodan, 1998) and behavior (Gabrielsson & Huse, 
2004). Economic actors—such as the directors, 
senior managers, and stakeholders—represent one of 
the company’s main assets who are able to affect its 
value with people knowledge (Grant, 1996), net-
works (Goergen, 2012), capabilities (Teece, Pisano, 
& Shuen, 1997; Wang & Ahmed, 2007), cognitive 
structure (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009), 
and behaviors (Huse, 2005).
2. Possible remedies for a “box ticking” approach can 
be divided into two main categories: ex ante and ex 
post the implementation of corporate governance 
principles. Ex ante remedies are related to the nego-
tiation process, that is, all companies should be 
involved in this process, providing them with the 
opportunity to discuss the actual corporate gover-
nance issues and to focus on the main governance 
standards. Ex post remedies are related to the devel-
opment and promotion of a corporate governance and 
compliance culture among corporate decision-mak-
ers, which is still lacking in some industries 
(Merendino, Timms, & Bek, 2016). The ex ante and 
ex post remedies are able to create a feedback loop, 
whereby the active engagement of the companies in 
the discussion of corporate governance issues will 
lead to a more substantial acceptance of the codes. 
This governance culture, in turn, may affect busi-
nesses’ participation in the following round of dis-
cussions and consultations on corporate governance 
issues.
3. As regards the prevention of corporate scandals, pro-
found improvements have occurred within the last 
two decades. However, there is still a lack of aware-
ness of the benefits of corporate governance recom-
mendations among decision-makers. However, the 
likelihood of scandals and corporate misconducts 
inevitably increases due to the hubris and short 
termism of directors, even though they may be aware 
of corporate governance codes. Indeed, hubris 
(Hayward & Hambrick, 1997) may lead to negative 
consequences for corporate governance, leadership, 
and firm performance (Park, Westphal, & Stern, 
2011). Therefore, corporate governance principles 
should incentivize a more long-term view of the cor-
poration and promote all those mechanisms that may 
minimize the hubristic behavior of directors. For 
example, codes can put forward mechanisms to hold 
the boardroom accountable for fulfilling long-term 
objectives, to strengthen the role of independent 
directors in listed and nonlisted companies and to 
improve leadership principles.
4. As regards Brexit, even though there is the urge by 
academics and practitioners to understand the impacts 
of Brexit on governance (Valsan, 2016; Wood & 
Budhwar, 2016), policy-makers are still unsure about 
its consequences, as Brexit is still in the early stages. 
This is similar to the situation that occurred during 
the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, when 
research (Lim, 2008) attempted to predict the effects 
of the crisis on corporate governance. It may be too 
early at this time to speculate about Brexit and its 
consequences on corporate governance. However, 
we argue that one of the effects associated with Brexit 
is that the European Union might be less influenced 
by the U.K. approach to corporate governance. The 
reason for this is that the European Union might try 
to make companies more aligned to similar corporate 
governance rules across the remaining 27 member 
states, which are all civil law countries in contrast to 
the United Kingdom, which is a common law coun-
try. Therefore, in the future, the United Kingdom, as 
an external single country, might have less power to 
influence corporate governance practices across the 
whole European Union.
5. Corporate governance harmonization or conver-
gence may be a chimera even within the same 
institutional setting (such as a country) as the per-
ceptions of corporate governance priorities diverge 
depending on the actors, for example, policy-mak-
ers, academia, businesses, and politicians. This 
adds an interesting perspective to the claim that the 
cultural and institutional settings are all that drive 
corporate governance differences across countries 
and continents (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). In other words, within a 
country or similar institutional settings, we could 
still experience different views on corporate gov-
ernance by politicians, other policy-makers, busi-
nesses, and academia. This within-country 
divergence may add to the organization’s complex-
ity (Schildt & Perkmann, 2017), whereby the orga-
nization is continuously influenced by various 
stakeholder groups, and institutional logics and 
environment (Greenwood, Kodeih, Micelotta, 
Raynard, & Lounsbury, 2011) such as shareholder 
versus stakeholder orientation (Meyer & 
Hammerschmid, 2006). This means that codes of 
corporate governance do not necessarily represent 
the best way to promote good practices, because 
they do not always take into consideration the 
institutional environment that a given country may 
have. Codes perhaps should contain minimum 
requirements that ensure the best practice of cor-
porate governance. This paves the way for future 
research that should aim to identify minimum as 
well as more effective principles that should be 
included in the corporate governance codes.
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6. Future research may focus on an organization as a 
nexus of people or human assets, and could analyze 
the functioning, the length, the complexity, and the 
impact of the investment chain on corporate gover-
nance. In addition, future studies could suggest tech-
niques and methods to foster an effective and efficient 
corporate governance culture among employers and 
decision-makers to go beyond the mere formal accep-
tance of principles.
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